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Abstract 
Traditional frameworks for evaluating scientific models have tended to downplay 
their exploratory function; instead they emphasize how models are inherently 
intended for specific phenomena and are to be judged by their ability to predict, 
reproduce, or explain empirical observations. By contrast, this paper argues that 
exploration should stand alongside explanation, prediction, and representation as a 
core function of scientific models. Thus, models often serve as starting points for 
future inquiry, as proofs of principle, as sources of potential explanations, and as a 
tool for reassessing the suitability of the target system (and sometimes of whole 
research agendas). This is illustrated by a case study of the varied career of reaction-
diffusion models in the study of biological pattern formation, which was initiated by 
Alan Turing in a classic 1952 paper. Initially regarded as mathematically elegant, but 
biologically irrelevant, demonstrations of how, in principle, spontaneous pattern 
formation could occur in an organism, such Turing models have only recently 
rebounded, thanks to advances in experimental techniques and computational 
methods. The long-delayed vindication of Turing’s initial model, it is argued, is best 
explained by recognizing it as an exploratory tool (rather than as a purported 
representation of an actual target system). 
1. Introduction 
 
It is a recurring feature of contemporary philosophical writing on scientific models that it 
begins by recognizing their heterogeneous and diverse nature. “Many different things”, we 
are told, “can serve as models including physically constructed scale models, model 
organisms, and mathematical objects such as sets of trajectories through a state-space” 
(Weisberg, 2007, pp. 216-217). It has been argued persuasively that, in spite of such 
diversity, models are instruments of inquiry in their own right, enjoying partial autonomy 
from both theory and data. Thus understood, models are neither mere approximations to an 
‘underlying’ fundamental theory, nor are they simply a convenient ‘shorthand’ for 
aggregating observations. As Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan put it, models, in a 
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manner of speaking, are located “outside the theory–world axis” (Morrison & Morgan, 1999, 
p. 17); their construction “involves a complex activity of integration” (Morrison, 1999, p. 44). 
While attention to the specifics of case studies has vastly improved our understanding of what 
models are, and how they are being constructed, when it comes to their evaluation and 
testing, more traditional criteria are typically being invoked. Thus, models are thought to be 
“inherently intended for specific phenomena” (Suárez, 1999, p. 75) and, importantly, are to 
be judged by their ability to predict, reproduce, or explain observational data. Indeed, in 
contexts that require selecting one of a set of candidate models, classical hypothesis-testing 
remains an important ‘intuition pump’ for how we ought to assess choices in modelling (e.g. 
(Steele & Werndl, forthcoming)), thereby subsuming the assessment of models under well-
understood – but ultimately limiting – frameworks for the evaluation of theoretical 
hypotheses. 
In this chapter, I shall argue that traditional frameworks for evaluating models have 
tended to downplay their exploratory function; or, to give my thesis a more positive spin, I 
shall make the case that exploration should stand alongside explanation, prediction, and 
representation as a core function of scientific models. This is not to deny that, often, scientific 
models are intended for specific observed phenomena, nor is it to claim that all modelling 
must be inherently exploratory; rather, it is intended to draw attention to the – largely 
overlooked – role of models and modelling in the context of exploratory science. Given the 
complementary nature of the goal of establishing exploration alongside (rather than in place 
of) the more traditional functions of scientific models, the main focus of this chapter is to 
bring out with as much as clarity as possible what we stand to gain from admitting 
exploration as a criterion for the evaluation of models. The overall thrust of the present paper, 
thus, is a constructive one, and little space will be devoted to the critique of more traditional 
criteria of assessment. (A comprehensive survey and critique of traditional accounts of 
modelling, along with a proposal of a more practice-oriented functional approach, is given in 
(Gelfert, 2016).) When formulated at this level of generality, the goal of establishing models 
as – at least in part – exploratory tools in science might seem vague and unspecific. At the 
very least, it calls for significant clarification, which is what the next two sections will 
attempt. Section 2 (‘Exploration, heuristics, and the (im)possibility of “theory-free” science’) 
positions the present paper in relation to the – by now, well-established – philosophical 
debate about exploratory experimentation, and tries to demarcate the notion of ‘exploration’ 
from the concept of ‘heuristics’, which has been the topic of a long-standing debate about the 
place of heuristic reasoning in science. In particular, it is argued that exploratory inquiry 
exhibits structure and is characterized by recurring strategies, both of which lend themselves 
to analysis and assessment in terms of their adequacy and fruitfulness. Section 3 (‘Functions 
and uses of exploratory models’) follows recent analyses by distinguishing between four 
main exploratory uses of models: as starting points for future inquiry, as proofs of principle, 
as sources of potential explanations, and as a tool for reassessing the suitability of the target 
system.
1
 These four aspects of exploratory modelling are neither intended to be exhaustive, 
nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, as I shall argue, the role of exploratory models as 
proofs of principle can be understood as addressing both methodological issues and 
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explanatory desiderata. Sometimes what needs to be demonstrated is the feasability of a 
particular (e.g., mathematical) approach, whereas on other occasions the proof of principle 
consists in specifying, by way of example, a ‘how-possibly’ explanation. 
Section 4 (‘The case of reaction-diffusion models for biological pattern formation’) 
undertakes a detailed case study of how the various functions of exploratory modelling 
interact, and work out, in practice. This is illustrated by the varied career of reaction-diffusion 
models in the study of biological pattern formation. First proposed by Alan Turing in 1952, 
the basic idea is that pattern formation in biological systems may arise from the interplay of 
two chemical substances (‘morphogens’), one of which is locally activated, while the other 
gives rise to long-range inhibition, with both differing in their diffusion rates. As a result, 
such Turing models predict distinct spatial patterns of different ‘chemical wavelengths’, 
corresponding to the concentration of the two morphogens, which in turn may trigger the 
expression of different phenotypes. Initially regarded as a mathematically elegant, but 
biologically irrelevant, proof of how, in principle, spontaneous pattern formation could occur, 
the model was subsequently obscured by other, more intuitively representational and 
empirically well-supported models. Only recently, due in part to the development of better 
computer simulation techniques, has the Turing model rebounded and has come to be 
recognized as contributing to our understanding of real-world cases of biological pattern 
formation. Exploration, then, holds out the promise of, but neither requires nor guarantees, 
long-term applicability of a model to specific real-world target systems. 
 
2. Exploration, heuristics, and the (im)possibility of ‘theory-free’ 
science 
 
On what is little more than a caricature view of the scientific method, science progresses 
through a series of bold hypotheses, from which predictions are deduced which are 
subsequently put to the test, leading us to give up our hypotheses when the predictions are 
found to be flawed, or to hold on to them – albeit only tentatively – for as long as our 
hypotheses pass whatever empirical tests we subject them to. The limitations, both 
descriptive and normative, of such extreme hypothetico-deductivism have, of course, long 
been a topic of philosophical discussion, and one would be hard-pressed, in this day and age, 
to find bona fide hypothetico-deductivists in large numbers. Yet, elements of this view have 
proved remarkably stubborn, not least the idea that the only way to assess science is by 
looking at its past track record of predictions and explanations (rather than, say, by 
developing a measure of what, following Thomas Nickles, one might call its “generative 
potential” (Nickles, 1985, p. 184)). Furthermore, testing – that is, the practice of bringing 
about circumstances that allow researchers to compare reality against previously derived, 
empirically observable consequences of a theory – becomes the gold standard for evaluating 
hypotheses, thereby neglecting the fact that “scientists sometimes reason their way towards 
hypotheses” and not “from hypotheses” towards testable conclusions (Hanson, 1960, p. 105). 
The issue has traditionally – sometimes misleadingly – been characterized in terms of 
Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between the “context of discovery” and the “context of 
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justification”, with only the latter being deemed capable of being rationally assessed. 
Research activities that precede the explicit formulation of hypotheses and theories, on this 
caricature view, would be considered to be of merely auxiliary value, subject to 
psychological, social, and other circumstantial factors which might perchance lead a scientist 
to stumble upon an improbable, yet ultimately fruitful, idea, but which could not easily be 
generalized to result in methodological guidelines for what constitutes good science. It goes 
(almost) without saying that this stark opposition between a (rationally assessable) “context 
of justification” and an (unruly and arbitrary) “context of discovery” is philosophically 
indefensible. As numerous authors have argued, it is based on conflating various aspects of 
scientific practice and its philosophical analysis. For one, it equates ‘discovery’ with the 
generation of novel ideas, as in the much-cited example of Friedrich August Kekulé’s 
(possibly apocryphal) daydream of the snake eating its own tail, which led him to 
hypothesize the novel chemical structure of the benzene ring. Yet, as Theodore Arabatzis has 
forcefully argued, a mere novel hypothesis – even if it later turns out to be true – does not yet 
qualify as a discovery, since ‘discovery’ is a success term and, as such, needs to be grounded 
in justificatory activity: “The context of discovery is ‘laden’ with the context of justification 
because ‘discovery’ is a term which refers to an epistemic achievement: if one succeeds in 
discovering something then, no doubt, this something exists.” (Arabatzis, 2006, p. 217) 
Instead of a binary distinction between two contexts, what one finds, then, is a spectrum of 
perspectives, each highlighting different (normative and descriptive) aspects and desiderata; 
any attempt to tease these apart will lead not to a single, but to a multiplicity of distinctions.
2
  
An overly narrow view of the relation between discovery and justification would be 
especially restrictive when turning one’s attention to the early stages of scientific inquiry, 
more specifically: to exploratory modes of inquiry. Labelling an episode of scientific 
research ‘exploratory’ is intended to convey more than just a sense of its priority in the 
chronological order of events. Rather, the label ‘exploratory’ pertains to a particular mode of 
doing science: one that aims at getting a grasp of a phenomenon or scientific problem in the 
absence of a well-understood and workable theory of the domain in question. For a theory to 
be well-understood and workable, it is not, of course, required that it be true, nor that it must 
aim for a reductionist account of whatever phenomenon is under investigation. Rather, the 
idea is that, in those cases that have traditionally received the most attention in philosophy of 
science, a significant prior body of theoretical knowledge can be assumed to be available, 
which in turn suggests – not by itself, of course, but in the hands of able scientists – a way of 
rendering the phenomenon theoretically tractable, at least in principle. By contrast, in 
exploratory research the existence of such a body of theoretical knowledge cannot be 
assumed, or is itself at issue. This means that, as analysts of the scientific process, we cannot 
readily turn to familiar patterns of making sense of what is going on in terms of applying 
theoretical knowledge to a particular case (or a particular class of cases). 
Nowhere is this more obvious than in cases of exploratory experimentation, which 
have garnered considerable interest from historians and philosophers of science over the past 
twenty years or so. In 1997, Friedrich Steinle and Richard Burian, independently of one 
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 Paul Hoyningen-Huene, in a much-cited paper, distinguishes between five different versions of how one might 
contrast discovery and justification in scientific practice. See (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). 
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another, published papers arguing for ‘exploratory experimentation’ as a distinctive mode of 
experimental inquiry in science. Where Steinle drew on the example of 19
th
-century 
electromagnetism to characterize exploratory experimentation as a research activity driven by 
“the elementary desire to obtain empirical regularities and to find out proper concepts and 
classifications by means of which those regularities can be formulated” (Steinle, 1997, p. 
S70), Burian cited work in mid-20
th
 century histochemistry as aiming for a stabilization of 
phenomena, notably via “stabilization of the protocols for locating particular molecular 
species” and for rendering them “relevant to the experimental and theoretical analyses of 
such other investigative traditions” (Burian, 1997, p. 42) as may be available. Exploratory 
experimentation, as Steinle puts it, cannot be divorced from “the process of forming and 
stabilizing the [new] conceptual framework” (Steinle, 1997, p. S72), which – needless to say 
– is made all the more difficult by the fact that, typically, in exploratory sciences “no well-
formed theory or even no conceptual framework is available or regarded as reliable” (Steinle, 
1997, p. S70). C. Kenneth Waters gives a rather succinct, yet insightful characterization of 
the relation between exploration and the absence (or at least inaccessibility) of fundamental 
theory, when he writes that “the aim of exploratory experiments is to generate significant 
findings about phenomena without appealing to a theory about these phenomena for the 
purpose of focusing experimental attention on a limited range of possible findings” (Waters, 
2007, p. 279) (italics original). 
As this brief characterization makes plain, exploratory experimentation cannot easily 
be – and certainly should not be! – assimilated to a view of science that regards experiments 
as exclusively, or even just primarily, in the business of testing theoretical hypotheses. For 
one, as the various discussants cited above agree, no well-formed body of theoretical 
principles from which such hypotheses may be derived exists in exploratory settings, and 
sometimes even the conceptual frameworks themselves are part of what is at issue. Testing, 
then, can at best be a tentative and local affair, and will necessarily be heavily invested with 
contentious background assumptions, since it will not generally be the case that one can 
simply hold the “theoretical” part of one’s exploratory investigations fixed. This is why, as 
Kevin Elliott puts it, exploratory experimentation is perhaps best understood as “an attempt to 
study a phenomenon using as many tools and techniques as possible so as to understand it 
more fully and to gain more solid epistemic access to it” (Elliott, 2007, p. 328). Necessarily, 
this process of getting a grasp on a phenomenon will often require multiple attempts and 
approaches from different directions. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger captures the spirit of such 
exploratory inquiry well, albeit in somewhat metaphorical language, when he insists that an 
“experiment is not only a test or an examination”, but more frequently “is an exploratory 
movement, a game in which one plays with possible positions, an open arrangement” 
(Rheinberger, 2010, p. 247). However, unlike in a well-defined game, where the rules specify 
when the game is over and who the winner is, in exploratory settings there is no guarantee 
that, at the end of an episode of inquiry, we will find ourselves having obtained a “winning” 
(true) hypothesis – even if exploration is carried out in the hope of at least identifying a 
fruitful approach. This reflects the hope, long cultivated by proponents of the heuristic value 
of abductive reasoning in science, that in contexts where it is unclear what is required in 
order to show a hypothesis H to be true (or false), we may yet be able to gain a better sense of 
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“what is required for deciding that H constitutes a plausible kind of conjecture” (Hanson, 
1960, p. 93). 
At the same time, it would be misleading to think of exploration as devoid of all 
theory. Theory can enter at various levels, sometimes explicitly so, without thereby reducing 
exploratory experimentation to merely a means of ‘testing’ theoretical hypotheses. For one, 
significant background knowledge – including background theory – will often be required for 
devising experiments if the latter are to improve our understanding of the phenomena that 
stand in need of ‘stabilization’. Furthermore, interpreting data and comparing experimental 
designs will likewise often be informed by theoretical considerations, even when the latter do 
not drive interpretation and design. Finally, as Elliott has noted, theory often “plays the role 
of a starting point of a ‘foil’ in the exploratory process” (Elliott, 2007, p. 327); this 
observation is borne out by a growing number of historical case studies of exploratory 
experimentation across the physical and biological sciences. Thus, while exploratory research 
often proceeds in the absence of a fully developed theory, is not driven by pre-existing 
theoretical concerns, and does not primarily aim at testing theoretical predictions, it need not 
(and perhaps could not) be entirely theory-free either.  
In order to avoid possible misunderstanding, it is perhaps worth drawing two further 
contrasts, with abduction and heuristics, respectively. Though closely related to exploration – 
insofar as both notions also aim to shed light on the interplay between discovery and 
justification – they highlight somewhat different aspects of the process of scientific inquiry 
and innovation. In its most generic form, abduction may be described as the process of 
inferring hypotheses (purported facts or, in science, laws of nature) that, if true, would render 
certain sentences plausible. Thus, if the latter report observations that have been made, 
abduction is of explanatory use – the inferred hypotheses are (potential) explanations of what 
has been observed – whereas if they concern predictions, it may be a powerful tool for 
unearthing new discoveries. Though the term ‘abduction’ is sometimes reserved for the 
process of generating plausible hypotheses (irrespective of their relative merits), more often 
than not it is equated to the process of inference to the best explanation, which has an obvious 
evaluative component. ‘Abduction’, then, may refer both to the generation of hypotheses 
concerning a given empirical phenomenon and to the process of assessing their relative merit. 
Yet note that both of these established usages take the existence of the explanandum for 
granted: what is at issue is not whether a stable phenomenon exists, but what explains it. By 
contrast, in contexts of exploratory research, it is often an open question whether or not a 
series of observations exhibits sufficient unity to count as a stable research object in the first 
place; exploration, in such a situation, may consist in probing the (experimental and/or 
theoretical) conditions under which one can hope to zero in on a purported phenomenon. In 
this sense, exploration may very well precede any explicit attempt at abductive inference.
3
 
Regarding the second contrast, one first needs to distinguish between the use of heuristics as 
mental shortcuts in judgment and decision-making – which, as a fact about human 
psychology, can be expected to play an important role in exploration as much as in any other 
domain of human cognition and behaviour – and the heuristic appraisal specific to science, 
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 Lorenzo Magnani has proposed the notion of “manipulative abduction” (Magnani, 2004), which appears to 
have greater affinity to exploration as discussed in this chapter than the standard “theoretical abduction”; on this 
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which “evaluates the promise, the future potential (including what is at stake), the problem-
solving capacity, or what we might call the ‘opportunity profile’ of a claim, technique, 
proposal, etc.” (Nickles, 2006, p. 161). To the extent that both may feature in science, they 
are concerned with (and are acknowledged by their proponents to be a matter of) 
“considerations relating to economy of research” (Nickles, 2006, p. 159) and to the efficient 
allocation of (material or temporal) resources. As such, they figure in “all stages of research” 
(Nickles, 2006, p. 165), not just in exploratory research. Though heuristic appraisal may 
encourage researchers to pursue exploratory strategies, as doing so may – at various points in 
scientific inquiry – be deemed the most promising allocation of resources, it is not itself 
identical to exploration. Exploration, in a nutshell, cannot be easily assimilated to either 
abductive inference or heuristic appraisal.   
3. Functions and uses of exploratory models 
 
While exploration precedes explicit hypothesis-testing and the emergence of a settled theory 
of the phenomena in question, it need not – as the discussion in the previous section makes 
plain – be  shielded from rational analysis. Even as the criteria for what constitutes 
fruitfulness may vary across subdisciplines, agreement as to whether a given exploratory 
move has been more or less fruitful can often be reached, sometimes quite straightforwardly. 
Why is this so? In the case of exploratory experimentation, a strong case can be made that in 
spite of its independence from specific theoretical frameworks regarding the target 
phenomenon, “experimental activity may well be highly systematic and driven by typical 
guidelines”. Such guidelines, as Steinle puts it, are of a “general methodological type” 
(Steinle, 1997, p. S70). At a descriptive level, they will be instantiated by recurring 
exploratory strategies; that is, by typical moves an experimenter can make in an attempt to 
gain an epistemic foothold. Some of these may seem trivial – an experimenter might, for 
example, systematically vary the different experimental parameters to see which changes 
have an influence on the phenomenon under investigation – others may require considerable 
ingenuity, such as trying to isolate hidden factors in order to find out which are superfluous 
and which are indispensable. Crucially, which exploratory strategies are promising, and 
which constraints they are operating under, will depend on the type of inquiry – e.g., 
measuring, experimentation, modelling, computer simulation etc. – and on the particulars of a 
given case. For example, when performing a field experiment in ecology, isolating a putative 
causal factor, or varying experimental parameters, will arguably take great skill and require 
significant resources; by contrast, when numerically modelling a phenomenon using a 
polynomial equation, systematically varying the model parameters may border on the trivial. 
As in the case of experimentation, then, exploratory uses of models need to constantly (or at 
least regularly) be assessed for their fruitfulness and suitability to the task at hand. 
A close affinity between modelling and exploration is only to be expected, given the 
origins of scientific models in what, at the time, were called ‘mechanical analogies’. When, 
for example, James Clerk Maxwell set out to get a grasp of electromagnetic phenomena, he 
proposed his molecular vortex model which, in retrospect, may be characterized as an attempt 
to model the electromagnetic field in mechanical terms. Maxwell is explicit about the 
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exploratory role of his vortex model: anyone who understands its “provisional and temporary 
character”, he argues, “will find himself rather helped than hindered by it in his search after 
the true interpretation of the phenomena” (Maxwell, 1890, p. 486). That his model was not 
merely a prop for the theoretical imagination, in the way that a sketch of a geometrical figure 
might be for a mathematician trying to construct a proof, is evident from the fact that 
Maxwell frequently moved back and forth between viewing the model as auxiliary and 
crediting it with new ontological content which allows it to guide our inquiry into the nature 
of electromagnetic phenomena. (See, e.g., (Harman, 1998).) In such cases, to adapt a passage 
written by Herman Meyer as early as 1951, “the construction of scientific models” itself is an 
instance of our “specifically human way of progressing from phenomenological description 
to scientific knowledge”; it is, Meyer agues, “a mental operation sui generis” (Meyer, 1951, 
p. 118). As we shall see, this point – that the construction of a model, irrespective of its 
detailed empirical performance, can afford knowledge – can be made more precise by 
highlighting the role of exploratory models in constructing what one might call proofs of 
principle. 
Before turning to a list of some of the distinct functions that exploratory models can 
serve, it is worth highlighting just one of the many strands in philosophical theorizing about 
what models are. (For a review of the ontology of models, see (Gelfert, 2017).) The starting 
point for this way of thinking about scientific models is somewhat akin to Meyer’s 
characterization of model construction as a “mental operation” in its own right, in that it ties 
scientific models closely to the cognitive processes involved in mental modelling. The 
recognition that much of human reasoning proceeds with ‘mental models’, by carrying out 
thought experiments on internal representations of scenarios (rather than by rigorously 
applying logical rules to propositional representations), has led some philosophers of 
scientific models, for example Nancy Nersessian, to the view that a mental model is “a 
structural analog of a real-world or imaginary situation, event, or process”, where this is 
meant to convey that “it embodies a representation of the spatial and temporal relations 
among, and the causal structures connecting the events and entities depicted and whatever 
other information that is relevant to the problem-solving tasks” (Nersessian, 1999, p. 11). 
There is, on this view, considerable continuity between the way we construct scientific 
models and the way we represent the world around us in thinking, whether we actively seek 
to represent real-world situations or, as in the quote above, imaginary situations, events, or 
processes. Given this symmetry between representing real and imagined, actual and possible 
scenarios, it should not come as a surprise that models – including, importantly, scientific 
models – allow us to extrapolate beyond the actual, thereby allowing us to also explore 
possible, e.g. counterfactual, scenarios. The use of models, then, is not restricted to the initial 
goal of representing actual target systems. Indeed, some classes of scientific models – such as 
toy models – typically only aim to provide potential explanations of general patterns, which 
happen to be actually instantiated, without thereby claiming to be able to identify the actually 
operative causal or explanatory factors.
4
 For present purposes, I shall neither pursue different 
accounts of what, in general, scientific models are, nor limit myself to just one class of 
models; rather, I shall focus on some important functions of exploratory modelling, giving 
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brief examples of each, before turning to an in-depth example, of models of biological pattern 
formation, in the next section. 
It is important to preface the subsequent discussion with a disclaimer to the effect that 
any list of exploratory functions of scientific models is likely to be incomplete and tentative. 
In distinguishing between four general functions of model-based exploration, I am following 
recent analyses by emphasizing that these functions are neither exhaustive nor mutually 
exclusive.
5
 Indeed, as we shall find, the same model may sometimes serve different 
exploratory goals at the same time. Another disclaimer concerns the fact that the models 
discussed here, for the most part, are formulated in the language of mathematics. While this is 
not by chance, it should not be taken to imply that exploration, in any of the senses to be 
discussed, is restricted to mathematical models only. A full explanation of why mathematical 
models lend themselves so well to exploratory uses is beyond the scope of this paper and 
would require close engagement with the literature concerning the applicability of 
mathematics to the natural sciences and with the role of well-developed symbolic formalisms 
in guiding, and constraining, the making of inferences.
6
 For present purposes, and in order to 
defuse worries about the choice of examples, perhaps it will suffice to note that scientists 
themselves – including those from the non-exact sciences – frequently presuppose this 
connection indirectly, and sometimes note it quite explicitly. Thus, in one of the rare explicit 
discussions of the exploratory role of models, the ecologist Peter J. Taylor notes that, while 
many theoretical and conceptual tools in biology function as schemas, i.e. as way of 
highlighting relevant basic processes, constraints, or (e.g. reproductive) strategies, “if the 
schema can be expressed in a mathematical formulation, the model becomes what I call an 
exploratory tool”. Mathematical investigation, Taylor notes, in a manner reminiscent of 
Steinle’s exploratory strategy of varying experimental parameters, allows biologists to study 
how “the system’s behaviour changes as its parameters change or becomes variables, as time 
lags are added, and so on” (Taylor, 1989, p. 122). In doing so, it allows for the formulation of 
new research questions or may suggest new terms and classifications, e.g. of systems-level 
behaviours. 
In distinguishing between different exploratory functions of models, it makes sense to 
proceed from ‘weaker’ to ‘stronger’ versions, where this does not imply that any such 
ordering is either necessary or unique. Rather, for reasons of exposition, it will be helpful to 
realize that there is a spectrum of exploratory strategies, some of which are more ambitious 
than others. At the ‘weak’ end of the spectrum, then, we find exploration being conducted in 
the hope of identifying fruitful ways of proceeding, in spite of the absence of a well-formed 
underlying theory. As William Wimsatt notes in relation to scientific models, an 
“oversimplified model may act as a starting point in a series of models of increasing 
complexity and realism” and may serve “to generate new predictive tests of or to give new 
significance to features of an alternative preferred model” (Wimsatt, 2007, p. 104/127). This 
first, relatively weak function of exploratory modelling may thus be described as aiming at 
starting points for future inquiry. One might worry that, in the early stages of research, 
virtually any move by a scientist or modeller, in some shape or form, aims at enabling future 
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inquiry, so that – in the absence of additional criteria for what should count as exploration – 
even “back-of-the-envelope” sketches would count as ‘exploratory models’ in this first sense. 
This may be so, but simply means that we may need to exercise a certain amount of self-
restraint in deploying the label. History and context will usually allow us to distinguish quite 
clearly between mere uninformed guesswork and fruitful, informed exploration that led to 
increasingly realistic and sophisticated models. Consider the case of models of traffic flow in 
sociodynamics. Early such models, which looked towards fluid dynamics for inspiration, 
were unsuccessful at explaining various features of the flow of human-operated vehicles. By 
the middle of the 20
th 
century, it had become clear that, for a model of car traffic to have any 
chance of being successful, it would need to include a variety of disparate influences, from 
physical quantities (such as velocity, acceleration, geometry of the vehicles) to psychological 
phenomena (e.g., reaction time of drivers). In 1953, the American engineer Louis Pipes 
proposed the first car-following model (Pipes, 1953), which was based on the idea that traffic 
flow is nothing but the cumulative effect of each driver, 𝑛, responding to the car in front of 
her, 𝑛 − 1. The corresponding positions can then be modelled, with d being the distance 
between the two vehicles at rest, 𝑙𝑛−1
𝑣𝑒ℎ  the length of the car in front, and 𝑇𝑣𝑛 the (velocity-
dependent) ‘legal distance’, in the form of the following equation: 
𝑥𝑛−1 = 𝑥𝑛 + 𝑑 + 𝑇𝑣𝑛 + 𝑙𝑛−1
𝑣𝑒ℎ . 
It is clear that this equation is neither fundamental nor complete, but – as the subsequent 
proliferation of more refined car-following models demonstrates (see (Wageningen-Kessels, 
et al., 2015)) – it proved a fruitful starting point for thinking of traffic as the cumulative effect 
of how drivers respond to each other. 
The second and third functions of exploratory modelling I wish to highlight – viz., 
providing proofs of principle and potential explanations – can, without much loss in terms of 
the sharpness of this distinction, be illustrated using the same example from population 
biology, the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. This model has become the 
textbook explanation for one of the most intriguing phenomena in population biology, 
namely the correlated oscillations in the size of populations of predator and prey species. 
Mathematically, the model consists of a pair of first-order, non-linear, differential equations 
linking the population size of one species to that of the other, in such a way as to reflect that 
one species is feeding on the other. The rate of change in each population is thus dependent 
on the other, but not in exactly the same way. Since the prey is typically a fast-reproducing 
species, its population size is primarily determined by reproduction (proportionate to the 
existing population size) and mortality due to predation (proportionate to its own population 
size and to that of the predator species). By contrast, the predator species is modelled as 
having a constant death rate, so the total number of deaths is proportionate to its population 
size, while its population growth (=the total number of births) is assumed to be proportionate 
to both its own population size and to that of the prey which, after all, sustains the predator 
species. Mathematically, this is represented as follows (with x indicating the size of the prey 
population, y the number of predators, t time, a the prey’s birth rate, b the predator’s death 
rate, and α, β positive coefficients representing the effect each population has on the other): 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡





= 𝑦(𝛽𝑥 − 𝑏) 
Because of the way the variables representing the two population sizes depend on each other, 
they exhibit a remarkable behaviour in time: both populations will oscillate indefinitely, the 
predator population lagging behind slightly, while the prey population overshoots quite 
dramatically. (See fig. 1) No stable equilibrium exists, only an unstable one that could not 
withstand the slightest (and, in any real-world situation, inevitable) perturbation. In other 
words, the Lotka-Volterra model exhibitis a distinctive, cyclical pattern: When the number of 
predators is low, the prey population will increase rapidly, even as the predator population 
begins to recover, which in turn will grow and will eventually bring down the total number of 
prey below the number needed to sustain the (now increased) predator population. 
 
Figure 1. Lotka-Volterra model 
What makes the Lotka-Volterra model significant as a tool of exploration is its dual 
character as a methodological proof of principle and a potential explanation. Consider the 
methodological aspect first. At any given point in time, the size of a population will be an 
integer number: there may be forty-five lynx roaming the forest, or four hundred twenty-two, 
but not 1.33 or √2. Changes in population size, likewise, come in units of one animal at a 
time: a live birth adds a member (or perhaps several) to the population, each death brings 
down the total number by one. Furthermore, births and deaths are discrete events in time, 
which raises the question of whether one should perhaps model population dynamics using 
discrete time steps. Yet, the Lotka-Volterra model demonstrates that it is possible to 
reproduce the qualitative behaviour of predator-prey systems using continuous differential 
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equations; that is, it constitutes a proof of principle that the methodology of continuous 
differential equations is suitable for generating insight into the dynamics of (discrete) 
populations. But the Lotka-Volterra does more than prove the point that we do not always 
need a discretized model to make sense of how populations behave, it also offers a potential 
explanation of an empirically salient phenomenon: the cyclical patterns of population growth, 
followed by near-collapse, in predator-prey systems. These patterns, observed across various 
species in different ecosystems – e.g., in lynx and snowshoe hares in the Hudson’s Bay area 
(inferred from hunting data) as well as in sharks and their prey (as reflected in the catch of 
fishermen in the Adriatic Sea) – had long been regarded as puzzling and as standing in need 
of an explanation. The Lotka-Volterra model explains how it is possible that such stark 
cyclical patterns, of rapid population growth periodically followed by steep decline, can 
emerge spontaneously, from within the two-species system containing the predator and prey 
species, without the need to posit any external forcings such as famine or disease. 
A perhaps less obvious, but nonetheless important function of exploratory modelling 
is the search for, or revision of, potential target systems. It is common to think of models as 
tools for representing actual target systems, or indeed as “inherently intended for specific 
phenomena” (Suárez, 1999, p. 75). From this perspective it may seem puzzling why, when 
faced with a mismatch between model and target, we should ever consider reassessing the 
target system, rather than revising our model to better fit the target. But recall that in an 
ongoing episode of exploratory research, it is often not obvious whether one has even 
succeeded in properly delineating a stable target system. And even if one has, one may find 
that the model that resulted from aiming at a specific target turns out to be better suited to the 
study of neighbouring phenomenon, or that one’s model has unexpected applications outside 
the originally intended domain of phenomena. In other words, what the target of our 
modelling efforts will eventually be – or, in more extreme cases, whether we can even expect 
there to be actual target systems that fit – may well remain an open question for as long as 
exploratory research has not yet become settled science.
7
 Sometimes, as the title of this 
chapter suggests, our models are in search of targets, and the next section will develop in 
more detail one such example of a well-developed set of model equations whose overall 
applicability to real target systems remains very much a matter of dispute. 
 
4. The case of reaction-diffusion models for biological pattern 
formation  
 
Only a couple of years before his untimely death, Alan Turing published an ambitious article, 
“The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis” (Turing, 1952), which set out “to account for the 
main phenomena of morphogenesis” by providing “a possible mechanism by which the genes 
of a zygote may determine the anatomical structure of the resulting organism”. Turing was 
careful to emphasize that he did not wish to “make any new hypotheses” of a biologically 
                                                 
7
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substantive kind; rather, he aimed to demonstrate in general terms how it may be the case 
“that certain well-known physical laws are sufficient to account for many of the facts” of the 
development of biological form. Previous attempts to apply mathematics to the problem of 
biological form, notably D’Arcy Thompson’s influential treatise On Growth and Form 
(1917), essentially tried to recreate various actual biological shapes in mathematical form 
and, via the method of transformed coordinates, showed how they can be transformed into 
one another. (Thompson, 1917) Yet, while Thompson’s text contains considerable discussion 
of the constraints on biological forms – arising from differences in the relative importance of 
the various forces, like gravitation and capillary forces, all operating at different scales – 
overall there is little concern with modelling potential causal mechanisms. By contrast, 
Turing explores biological pattern formation by mathematically modelling a possible 
mechanism how biological form develops from the zygote. 
Turing’s starting point is a general puzzle concerning the origins of biological form. 
All organisms begin as undifferentiated zygotes that, for all intents and purposes, exhibit no 
preferred directionality or spatial structure. On the one hand, an embryo in its early (blastula) 
stage, exhibits “spherical symmetry, or if there are any deviations from perfect symmetry, 
they cannot be regarded as of any particular importance, for the deviations vary greatly from 
embryo to embryo within a species, though the organisms developed from them are barely 
distinguishable” (Turing, 1952, p. 41). On the other hand, fully grown organisms, such as a 
horse (“which is not spherically symmetrical”, as Turing quite rightly notes; ibid.), have 
considerable internal structure, which defines their morphological characteristics. It might 
seem puzzling how, at some point during an organism’s development, the symmetry and 
homogeneity of the early embryo can give way to distinctive, and formative, spatial patterns. 
Part of the puzzlement regarding this transition, however, arises from what Turing calls the 
“fallacy” of assuming “that the deviations from spherical symmetry in the blastula could be 
ignored because it makes no particular difference what form of asymmetry there is” (Turing, 
1952, p. 42). For, it is important that some such deviations will inevitably occur, and if a 
developing embryo responds by amplifying them in systematic ways, it may reach a new and 
stable equilibrium that lacks the original symmetry and brings determinate spatial patterns 
into existence. In his paper, Turing aims to specify just such a mechanism, by which small 
fluctuations can trigger, in a predictable and systematic fashion, pattern formation in what 
would otherwise be homogeneous systems. 
The central idea behind Turing’s model is that two (or more) diffusible substances 
(dubbed “morphogens”) can interact with each other in such a way as to form “reaction-
diffusion systems” which establish chemical gradients within an organism, which, in turn, 
give rise to self-organized biological patterns. For such pattern formation to emerge 
spontaneously in an otherwise homogeneous system, at minimum two linked morphogens are 
required. If only one morphogen were present, though it could be locally produced and 
diffuse across an organism, it could at best trigger the expression of a preformed pattern, e.g. 
by “switching on” a gene that was unevenly distributed across the organism (or responded to 
different concentrations of the same morphogen). It could not, however, bring about, say, 
periodic patterns in an otherwise homogeneous population of cells. Adding a second 
morphogen changes the situation fundamentally, provided we allow for the possibility of the 
rates of production and activation of the two substances being coupled to one another. In 
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addition to diffusion, we then have a reaction that produces the morphogens, in ways that are 
not merely superpositions of two independent processes, but are dynamically coupled. 
Turing’s model, thus, includes two morphogens, S and P, diffusing homogeneously (except 
for random fluctuations) within a certain space, with one being locally self-enhanced and the 
other being capable of long-range inhibition of the first. Because of the differential diffusion 
rates of the two molecules, and the way in which the more slowly diffusing molecule both 
stimulates the production of itself (self-enhancement) and the production of its own inhibitor, 
a range of possibilities for pattern formation opens up. To see how this may occur, consider a 
random distribution of the two morphogens at time 𝑡1 and its evolution over time (see fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Reaction-diffusion time evolution 
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P enhances its own production (e.g. autocalytically) and diffuses slowly, so has a 
tendency to concentrate into peaks, even without the presence of S (time 𝑡1). Moreover, since 
P also stimulates production of S, its own (quickly diffusing) inhibitor, these peaks will 
become more localized as P’s concentration will fall quickly as one moves away from a 
given peak (time 𝑡2). Of course, as S diffuses further in space, its concentration will 
eventually fall below the level needed to inhibit the formation of further peaks in the 
concentration of P. Where S is sufficiently diluted, new peaks of P can emerge in the same 
fashion. The result is a “standing wave” pattern, with localized peaks of P at more or less 
regular intervals in space (time 𝑡3). 
The discussion so far makes it plausible that the mutual interaction between two 
substances, a (self-)activating morphogen and a quickly diffusing inhibitor which together 
have the twin effects of local activation and long-range inhibition, can explain spontanenous 
pattern formation in what would otherwise, barring inevitable fluctuations, be a homogeneous 
medium. The specific pattern, of course, will depend on the various parameters that 
characterize the reaction and diffusion process: the rate of production of each substance (and 
its dependence on the concentration of the other), the rate of degradation and the differential 
speed with which each substance diffuses. Mathematically, this is captured by the following 
set of equations, which express the rates of concentration change as the sum of reaction terms 




= 𝐹(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝑑𝑢𝑣 + 𝐷𝑢∆𝑢 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑡
= 𝐺(𝑢, 𝑣) − 𝑑𝑣𝑣 + 𝐷𝑣∆𝑣 
 
where u and v refer to the concentrations of the P and S, respectively. Not all mathematically 
stable solutions to the model equations are associated with the formation of salient and 
stationary patterns; some give rise to oscillatory waves or uniform distributions. Those 
solutions that essentially correspond to stationary waves with finite wavelength – or, Turing 
patterns, as they are now called – themselves exhibit great variety (see fig. 3). Visual 
inspection shows that these basic solutions already bear significant resemblance to actual 
patterns found in various organisms, such as giraffes, the striped zebrafish, and the African 
leopard. Through minor modifications – e.g. by tweaking the boundary conditions, or ‘adding 
on’ another Turing-style system of morphogens – it is possible to recreate a vast number of 
different arrangements of spots, stripes, swirls, and splodges, such that, through clever choice 
of parameters, it should be possible to explain various types of patterns found in nature. Or so 





Figure 3. Turing patterns. (Image courtesy of Shigeru Kondo.) 
Turing wrote as a non-biologist at a time when little was known about the molecular 
basis of biological pattern formation. So it is hardly surprising that he was unable to specify 
any actual biological examples of his two-morphogen reaction-diffusion model. Neither was 
this his goal: as he makes clear throughout the paper, his main objective – in line with our 
third function of exploratory modelling discussed in the previous section – was to provide a 
potential explanation of how biological patterns form spontaneously as part of an organism’s 
development. He is explicit in characterizing his model as merely “a possible mechanism” 
(Turing, 1952, p. 37) and, in the concluding paragraph of his paper, weakens this goal further 
when he expresses his hope “that the imaginary biological systems which have been treated, 
and the principles which have been discussed, should be of some help in interpreting real 
biological forms” (Turing, 1952, p. 72). Arguably, more is required than merely functioning 
as an interpretative tool if a model is to count as doing actual explanatory work. As Shigeru 
Kondo and Takashi Miura put it in a favourable review of half a century or so of work on the 
Turing model: “No matter how vividly or faithfully a mathematical simulation might 
replicate an actual biological pattern, this alone does not constitute proof that the simulated 
state reflects the reality.” (Kondo & Miura, 2010, p. 1617) It will be instructive, then, to look 
in a little more detail at the track record of Turing’s model and how it has fared with respect 
to real-world cases. 
Turing is not entirely silent on what kinds of pattern formation he thinks may 
potentially be explained by his model. First, he begins his paper by stating that he will 
describe “a mathematical model of the growing embryo” (Turing, 1952, p. 37), thereby 
suggesting that one of the explananda he is interested is how the early embryo’s spherical 
symmetry is broken and how organisms acquire basic spatial organization. In this sense, 
Turing’s professed goal is more ambitious than simply providing a potential mechanism for 
how certain surface characteristics – such as animal coat patterns – may form. Second, 
towards the end of his paper, Turing refers to a number of botanical examples, such as the 
arrangement, number, and symmetries of whorls of leaves of certain plants such as Woodruff 
(Asperula odorata). (The choice of the latter example – leaves growing around a circular 
stem of a plant – may be partly driven by his mathematical choice of a ring-like structure as 
one of the boundary conditions for his mathematical model.) Both kinds of cases, through no 
fault of Turing’s, turned out to be less than ideal as illustrations of his model. From the late 
1970s onwards, one of the main model organisms for the study of general morphogenesis was 
the fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster), largely due to its manageable size and quick 
generation time, which made fruit flies the preferred model of how spatial organization 
comes about. However, while early embryonic development in Drosophila does exhibit 
standing wave patterns that are reminiscent of what the Turing model might have predicted, 
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further investigation showed development and spatial patterning to be far more complicated, 
with the sequence of segments in the fly’s body being determined by a set of maternal, gap, 
pair-rule and segment polarity genes, each of which is responsible for a different aspect of the 
organism’s orgniazation (e.g., anterior/posterior asymmetry, division into head, thorax, and 
abdominal regions, etc.). In other words, not only did the dominant model organism’s 
morphogenetic development not lend itself to being modelled in line with Turing’s proposal, 
the very complexity of the actual developmental process suggested that the simple design of 
the Turing model might simply not have been favoured by evolution. 
The case of plant development may be seen as even less convincing. For one, plants, 
due to their fixed location in space, may be subject to external factors (such as the relative 
position to the sun) whose influence could, at least potentially, suffice to break the symmetry, 
which would render the example rather less relevant to the question of embryonic 
morphogenesis in (esp. higher) animals. For plant morphogenesis in general, there must 
likewise be other considerations and constraints, as Turing was well aware. Recall that stable 
Turing patterns may be thought of as ‘standing waves’ of sorts (i.e., patterns that are brought 
about by the ‘standing wave’-like distribution of the relevant morphogens in the organism). 
Whorls of leaves are presumed, by Turing, to “originate in rings of active tissue” (Turing, 
1952, p. 68), with the number of leaves corresponding roughly to the circumference of the 
ring divided by the ‘chemical wavelength’ of whatever morphogen is responsible for leaf 
formation. Whereas in species such as Asperula odorata the arrangement of between five and 
nine leaves into a whorl fits reasonably well with Turing’s idea, his model cannot easily be 
extended even to something as closely related as flower petals. For, as Turing himself notes, 
“when all species are taken into account one must expect that the diameters of the rings 
concerned will take on nearly all values within a considerable range” (Turing, 1952, p. 69) 
and that there will also be some variation in chemical wavelength. By the logic of his own 
model, then, the number of petals on flowers should be expected to vary considerably, less so 
within the same species (though even there we should expect the variation across individual 
specimens to give rise to significant numerical variation in the number of petals and other 
elements), but most definitely across different species since, in principle, within a certain 
reasonable interval, any number should be as likely as any other to be the result of dividing 
the circumference by the (likewise variable) chemical wavelength. Yet, as Turing notes, this 
is not what one finds in nature: “The number five is extremely common, and the number 
seven rather rare.” (Turing, 1952, p. 69) 
For the longest time, developmental biologists regarded Turing’s model as 
mathematically elegant, but biologically irrelevant. There are many reasons why this was so, 
and a full discussion of the history of the Turing model and its reception is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to say that Turing’s mathematical approach and his formal 
presentation, together with the underdeveloped (and ultimately unconvincing) biological 
examples he had given, did not mesh well with the epistemic culture of developmental 
biology. Solving the equations of Turing’s model even approximately required mathematical 
training and ingenuity that few developmental biologists had, and by the time computer 
simulation methods were gradually becoming more widely used, another – more intuitive – 
model, Lewis Wolpert’s ‘French flag model’ (Wolpert, 1969), had won over the majority of 
those developmental biologists interested in biological pattern formation.  
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In order to understand Wolpert’s model, consider a layer of cells which, for ease of 
illustration, we can imagine to be in the shape of a rectangle. A group of cells along the left-
hand edge of the tissue is continuously producing a single morphogen S which diffuses 
linearly, so as to create a smooth gradient from left (high concentration of S) to the right (low 
concentration). (Let us further posit that, on the right-hand edge, there is a ‘sink’, where S 
disappears, or perhaps decays, so that we need not worry about saturation due to the 
continuous production of S on the left-hand side.) Once a stable distribution has been reached 
throughout the system, the concentration of S at a given point in space effectively provides 
positional information regarding how far along the rectangular strip of tissue we are. In a 
second step, cells can then respond to the positional information that is available to them. In 
the simplest case, a cell might simply be programmed to react differently to different 
concentrations of S around it. If, for example, cells reacted to high concentrations of 𝑐 > 𝑐𝐵 
(where 𝑐𝐵 is a threshold concentration required for certain genes to be ‘switched on’, say) by 
turning blue, to intermediate concentrations  𝑐𝐵 > 𝑐 > 𝑐𝑅 by turning white, and to low 
concentrations 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐 by turning red, what would emerge in the scenario described is a tri-
color pattern, blue-white-red: hence, the designation of ‘French flag model’. Empirical 
support came from a variety of experiments and observations. In a series of experiments in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, researchers identified signal-producing structures of just the 
kind described in the thought experiment: in experiments with chicken embryos, it was found 
that the apical ectodermal ridge, a thick layer of ectoderm that rims the tip of the developing 
limb bud, is crucial to chondrogenesis. If removed, the formation of the limb would be 
truncated, whereas if a piece of thigh mesoderm was grafted on top of it, rather than 
developing into more thigh tissue, it would grow into (sometimes an additional) limb. (See 
(Saunders, et al., 1957).) Additional support for the idea that it only takes a single morphogen 
to ‘unlock’ different genetic programmes in response to the positional information contained 
in its concentration gradient comes from the further observation that, in many organisms 
(e.g.,  salamanders), whole limbs can be regenerated when removed. Furthermore, the French 
flag model can explain why patterns are stable even as overall size varies: if, as in the thought 
experiment, cells respond in only three distinct ways – by turning blue, white, or red – then, 
whether the area is small or large (and, hence, the concentration gradient more or less steep), 
one will always find a tri-color pattern. By contrast, a Turing mechanism would likely predict 
a variable number of stripes, due to the interplay between the chemical wavelength associated 
with the reaction-diffusion process and the overall geometry of the tissue sample. In light of 
such seemingly clearcut empirical evidence, and given the intuitive appeal of the ‘French flag 
model’, interest in the Turing model diminished. When, in 1979, Stuart Newman and Harry 
Frisch put forward a mathematical model of chick limb that had “affinities to that of Turing” 
(Newman & Frisch, 1979, p. 662), this generated some initial interest, but did not as a whole 
diminish the dominance of the ‘French flag model’. Though Newman and Frisch included a 
(given the computer technology at the time, highly ‘pixelated’) sketch of how chondrogenesis 
might come about over time within their model, this does not seem to have tipped the balance 
of evidence in their favour either – not least since the development of the chick’s distinctive 
limb with its three, morphologically very different fingers was seen as an especially 
convincing case of how, in the spirit of the ‘French flag model’, very different patternings 
needed to be ‘unlocked’ for each of the three fingers. 
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It was not until the mid-1990s that new experimental evidence and simulation 
techniques became available that led to a revival of interest in the Turing model. Importantly, 
it was the interplay between experimental manipulation and model-based simulation that, as 
we shall see, made all the difference. Recall that one of the perceived advantages of the 
‘French flag model’ was its ability to explain how, in the words of a recent textbook, “the 
system could also regenerate the complete original pattern if it were cut in half” (Wolpert, et 
al., 2015, p. 29) or otherwise disturbed. In a series of experiments on striped tropical fish 
(Pomacanthus imperator, or Emperor angelfish), Shigeru Kondo and Rihito Asai (Kondo & 
Asai, 1995) manipulated their distinctive striped pattern via laser ablation of pigment cells, 
which removed a small portion of a stripe. Instead of the parallel stripes simply regrowing to 
complete the original pattern, as would be expected from within the ‘French flag model’, the 
lower stripe changed direction and shifted upwards, partially completing the upper stripe, 
while maintaining the spatial interval between the two stripes. This led to a distinctive and 
reproducible pattern of regrowth, different from the original pattern, which was more in line 
with a dynamic response to the twin processes of local activation and long-range inhibition 
than with the expression of a preformed pattern or a simple ‘triggering’ of a response by a 
simple gradient. Computer simulations confirmed that a suitably adjusted Turing model, but 
not a ‘French flag model’, was able to account for the distinctive spatial patterning associated 
with regrowth. (See fig. 4; for a review, see (Kondo & Miura, 2010).) 
 
 
Figure 4. Re-arrangement of stripe pattern of Pomacanthus imperator; observation (a-c) vs. Turing model simulations 
(d-f). (Image courtesy of Shigeru Kondo.) 
At least in part, then, it was due to the advent of better simulation techniques, which 
allowed for more subtle ways of exploring the phenomenon – for instance, by ‘disturbing’ 
(and otherwise manipulating) existing patterns and comparing the simulated response of the 
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Turing system with observed patterns of re-growth – that Turing’s approach gained new 
traction as a model of biological pattern formation. In addition, there has been the growing 
realization among researchers that, for the Turing model to be fruitful and afford insight into 
how biological pattern formation works, we need not actually discover two molecules whose 
chemical characteristics match those posited by Turing’s account of the interaction between 
an activator and an inhibitor. Rather than treating Turing’s model as a hypothetical 
representation of a two-morphogen system and making it our goal to discover an actual pair 
of substances that exhibit the posited chemical behaviour, we can consider the model as itself 
a hypothetical realization of the twin processes of local activation and long-range inhibition. 
After all, we should expect that what matters for self-organized pattern formation is not the 
precise number of different substances involved, or their specific chemical characteristics, but 
rather the fact that some underlying structure must realize the coupling of local activation 
with long-range inhibition. Interestingly, it was subsequently shown that in zebrafish the skin 
patterns are set up and maintained not directly in response to differential diffusion rates of 
two morphogens, but by a network of interactions between neighbouring pigment cells. 
While “the shape of the network is different from that of the original Turing model, it fits the 
short-range positive, long-range negative feedback description” (Kondo & Miura, 2010, p. 
1619). While it would thus be incorrect to consider the original Turing model a faithful 
representation of pattern formation in this particular species, it is in virtue of exploration on 
its basis that other realizations of local activation and long-range inhibition – in this and other 
species – were identified, and were found to be drivers of biological pattern formation of the 
same qualitative type as Turing had predicted. Indeed, in presenting their work, Kondo and 
his collaborators are adamant that they have identified “the essential conditions for generating 
the Turing pattern” in zebrafish and related species. (Pattern Formation Group, n.d.) By 
tweaking the original Turing model ever so slightly, it has thus become possible to open up 
ever more potential applications of the model. This has led to a reassessment of the original 
research agenda: no longer was the focus exclusively on embryonic development, but it has 
now come to encompass also the question of how biological organisms maintain the integrity 
of their morphological features, as demonstrated by Kondo and Asai’s research on repair skin 
patterns in different fish species (see fig. 4). This nicely illustrates how exploratory modelling 
can reorient research agendas and can help identify productive new targets of scientific 
inquiry. 
Contemporary developmental biology acknowledges the importance of the Turing 
mechanism as one of several key elements in the formation of biological patterns. While it 
may be too early, and while the field of developmental biology may be too diverse, to speak 
of a consensus, there appears to be a growing sense that real-life cases of pattern formation in 
biology often involve both, a (basic) periodic Turing pattern and a more specific patterning 
for each of the periodic elements thus brought about. A paradigmatic case would be limb 
formation. (See (Sheth, et al., 2012).) Whereas in the past it was thought that each digit was 
encoded by a separate genetic programme, research involving the ‘knocking out’ of Hox 
genes has convinced many researchers that, early on in its development, the limb bud is 
structured by a wave-like Turing pattern, and that the specific differences between digits are 
the result of further ‘Wolpert-style’ patterning of each individual element: in other words, the 
initial “periodic patterning is normally subject to a type of positional signal that varies along 
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the proximodistal axis of the limb” (Green & Sharpe, 2015, p. 1210). The story of the Turing 
model as presented in this paper, then, is not one of an “underdog theory” displacing “the 
received view”: both models, Turing’s reaction-diffusion model and Wolpert’s positional 
information model, remain relevant and are legitimate and important sources of insight. 
Rather, what this historical episode illustrates is how a model that did, in a very clear sense, 
constitute a proof of principle for self-organized pattern formation, can go out of fashion and 
subsequently rebound. Some of the reasons that likely contributed to the initial lack of uptake 
among developmental biologists have already been mentioned: sociological reasons having to 
do with different epistemic styles (in this case, the clash between mathematical methods and 
experimentally-oriented developmental biology); lack of sufficiently sophisticated computer 
simulation techniques that would have allowed for a more detailed rendering of the finer 
details of Turing patterns (and which might have lent more credibility to Newman and 
Frisch’s calculation of the development of the chick limb); and the absence of empirical 
observations of the posited two-morphogen systems. Yet, once this began to change, notably 
through the study of tell-tale distortions of small-scale structures in angelfish and zebrafish 
(thanks to the availability of new experimental and simulation techniques), the model was 
able to rebound – not necessarily as a faithful representation of pattern formation in any one 
species in particular, but as a tool of exploration, which allowed scientists to converge upon 
fruitful avenues of research. Indeed, the very fact that researchers now consider the Turing 
model useful not only in the (recently more promising; see (Maini, et al., 2006)) search for 
two-morphogen systems, but also in relation to other ways of realizing the twin processes of 
local activation and long-range inhibition – e.g., via networks of interaction between 




At the beginning of this chapter, I wrote that exploration should stand alongside more 
traditional criteria for assessing models (such as explanatory, predictive, and representational 
success). The case of the Turing model illustrates why it may be worth valuing exploratory 
fruitfulness in its own right. At several crucial junctures in the Turing’s model varied career, 
it would have been quite misguided to hold it to the standards of traditional hypothesis-
testing, given the level of generality at which it was formulated and the inability of scientists, 
at the time, to identify the molecular basis of biological development. To put things another 
way, had Turing’s model been treated exclusively as a way of representing real target 
systems, it would have had to be regarded, if not as a non-starter, then certainly as 
empirically unsuccessful. And, as we have seen, such doubts about the model’s applicability 
to real-world systems were common among developmental biologists. Yet, in spite of its 
perceived empirical shortcomings, the model was never discarded completely, and rightly so. 
This is because, in the spirit of Turing’s own professed aim – that is, to offer no more and no 
less than “a possible mechanism” by which spontaneous pattern formation in living beings 
may occur – a minority of researchers recognized that the model’s primary function was (and, 
to a large extent, remains) exploratory. That is, it was not geared towards representing any 
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one target system, or class of target systems, in particular, but towards ‘standing in’ (or, as 
one might put it in order to highlight its function as a proof of principle, ‘filling in’) for 
whatever it is that realizes the twin processes of local activation and long-range inhibition and 
thereby brings about spontaneous pattern formation in some biological systems. From the 
start, the same basic model equations were intended to be potentially applicable to 
biochemically quite different potential target systems, and, as discussed in the previous 
section, this exploratory potential of the model was subsequently vindicated by novel 
observations across a range of species. Without an acknowledgment of the fundamental role 
of exploration in scientific modelling, the longevity of Turing’s reaction-diffusion model – 
which made its recent renaissance possible – would be little more than a historical anomaly, 
and its productive role in opening up new avenues of inquiry would have to be seen as a 
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